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Abstract. Responsibility to Protect is yet another step in post war evolution of international response against genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Author analyses the concept of R2P through the lens of balancing national interests of the 
UN Member States (state security, human security, budgetary balance, independence) with international values (solidarity, human rights, 
peace, security). Author underlines that global responses and actions to prevent and end mass atrocities still lack comprehensive and 
unified approach. Due to diverse interests of each state, international community faces problems dealing with consequences of atrocities. 
Author believes that states as individual members of international community are bound to redefine their national interests from the 
perspective of international community’s responsibility to protect populations from mass atrocities. Such redefinition should be facilitated 
by the UN through promotion of effective multilateral approach towards R2P implementation. 
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Introduction 
In September 2005, during the UN World Summit, the participating representatives of states concluded an 
agreement on the concept of Responsibility to Protect (hereinafter R2P), which was shaped in Summit’s 
Outcome Document paras. 138-139: 
“Par. 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. 
We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community 
should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the 
United Nations in establishing an early warning capability”. 
“Par. 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters 
VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
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and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely 
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and 
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping 
States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts 
break out.” 
 
The endorsement of R2P by the General Assembly serves as a starting point for the concept’s continuous 
political and legal evolution within the international agenda. This conceptual evolution is led mainly by the UN 
Secretary-General who explains and disseminates the ideas behind responsibility to protect through his annual 
reports (the SG's reports of 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). In the first one of 2009 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect the Secretary-General introduced three pillars agenda of 
responsibility to protect:  
 
i. Pillar I - States have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; 
ii. Pillar II - the international community shall provide assistance to States in building capacity to 
protect their populations from these atrocities and to assist those, which are under stress before 
crises and conflicts break out; 
iii. Pillar III - in case of State manifestly failing to protect its populations international community 
shall take timely and decisive action to prevent and halt these atrocities (the SG’s report, 2009, 
section II-IV). 
 
According to the above-mentioned Pillars international community bears two inseparable responsibilities 1) to 
assist states in building their capacity to protect their populations, and 2) to react in timely and decisive manner 
in case of states manifestly failing in their primary responsibility to protect. Author's assessment of the 
responsibilities under Pillar II and III relates primarily to the UN and its Member States as representatives of 
international community (Glanville, 2011, p. 483). The UN in particular should be considered as a major actor 
here due to its identity as a leader in creating peace, human rights and democracy-based international 
environment. 
 
This particular identity is the result of international values as enshrined in the UN Charter, it also reflects 
particularities among the UN Member States. Such bipolar approach towards R2P implementation is based on 
the fact that both Member States and the UN (as a separate subject of international law) are distinct members of 
international community, which according to the 2005 Summit Outcome Document is the main bearer of 
responsibilities under Pillar II and III. The question is even more troublesome, when one realizes that R2P 
depends on two levels of international governance and policymaking: universal (represented by the UN and its 
organs) and national (represented by its Member States). It is obvious that these levels do not always correspond 
to each other. Even if the commitment to protect certain international values is identical, the means and methods 
of achieving this protection differ depending on who executes it. The main differences can already be observed 
in policies on R2P implementation adopted by individual states. These expressions presented on different 
occasions (e.g. during Libyan and Syrian humanitarian catastrophes) sometimes do not follow the official UN 
position on R2P. 
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At national level, the effective R2P implementation entails a significant burden for the state and implies 
accepting various political, financial and legal commitments, therefore it is always difficult to establish a unified 
approach among the Member States of an international organisation. For instance, ongoing humanitarian 
catastrophe in Syria demonstrates that these inconsistencies undermine the timely and decisive actions taken 
under R2P. Although International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention (body which in 2011 
introduced R2P to international community) indicated that the permanent members of the UN Security Council 
should refrain from veto when their vital interests are not at stake, Russia and China have vetoed three 
resolutions emphasizing the responsibility of the government of Syria for mass crimes and another resolution on 
referring the situation to the ICC (Adams, 2015). This inconsistency leads to non-credibility of the UN as a 
whole, for it is unable to present a unified approach while dealing with the effects of humanitarian crisis in Syria. 
 
The author aims at demonstrating that the inconsistencies mentioned above undermines the effective R2P 
implementation. In the first part of this article, the notion of international values and its impact on understanding 
responsibility to protect is explained. This serves as a basis for further interpretation of the notion of national 
interest (under constitutional provisions of the Republic of Poland), which does not always follow the universal 
catalogue of these values. In the next part the author, inspired by the ideas of G. Evans and A. Pert, underlines 
the gravity of ‘good international citizenship’ as the direction, which should be accepted by states as a modern 
way of exercising international solidarity based on active engagement in application of human rights treaties and 
multilateralism. Finally, the author evaluates multilateralism as a possible chance of solving problem of 
inconsistency in R2P implementation. 
 
1. Responsibility to protect, international values and national interest 
 
Each community shares some basic values, which reflect on their understanding of well-being. This applies to 
communities within a state, regional communities and the international community as a whole. The main 
question here is what constitutes the common international catalogue of values the international community 
seeks to protect. Establishing which values are considered as fundamental is essential for the correct 
interpretation of the objectives and functions of international law (Kwiecień, 2004, p. 86). Global values are 
flexible and evolve with the changing times. Slavery, ordinary and socially acceptable phenomenon for 
millennia, had been condemned and finally virtually disappeared. Aggression, once a standard tool of states 
policy, is now internationally banned (Florini, 1996, p. 363). International values protected in a certain period of 
time, may lose the protection in some time later.  
 
International values can be defined as persistent, globally shared beliefs that a certain state of the world, which is 
possible to achieve, is socially desirable, creating the prospect of life of all human beings, as opposed to the 
opposite state of the world (Spijkers, 2011, Ch. II). In other words, values are based on goods understood as the 
state of affairs, which is positively considered by a given community (Ziembiński, 1993 p. 15). Under 
responsibility to protect such state of affairs can be described as the well-being of populations. R2P is based on 
assumption that axiological unity of international community is well-established, meaning that there is no doubt 
that mass atrocities are wrong deeds which shall be condemned and eradicated (Lewandowski, 2015, p. 187). 
But means and methods necessary to achieve this state of affairs are not as universally agreed as the goal itself. 
R2P is only one of such means. The concept does not constitute an international value per se (it would be hard to 
treat R2P as a state of affairs), but it is a collection of tools applicable for the protection of the well-being of the 
community. From this point of view, R2P can be seen as an instrumental value – a mean for achieving the 
preferable international value (Ziembiński, 1993 p. 18). In other words, R2P is a good example of moral doctrine 
consisting of systematic list of moral norms and evaluations accompanied with argumentation for respecting 
them (Ziembiński, 1963, p. 37), which, however, is a subject to discussions on their efficiency, reliability or 
costs. 
 
These discussions mainly result from the fact that achieving the common good of international community often 
requires taking actions, which do not correspond with community values expressed by national entities. Even 
Tomasz A. Lewandowski  
International Comparative Jurisprudence 2017 3 (1) 93-103 
 
 
 
96 
though international set of values can be recognized by a national community, it can still reflect incompatible 
and divergent standards of individual national societies (Ziembiński, 1963, p. 106). Therefore, R2P performance 
depends on its capacity to shape not only international but also national systems of values (Lewandowski, 2015, 
p. 187). 
 
From the national perspective, it is clear that the main purpose of states is to guarantee and protect the well-being 
for all its population. This reflects the idea behind the Pillar I of responsibility to protect and can also be 
represented in terms of national interest understood as a ‘set of goals and values of the highest value for the state, 
for which the whole nation works’ (Warsaw AON 1994, p. 49). The Polish Constitution, as a source of 
axiological foundations of the state, serves as a basis for determining the national interest of the Republic 
Poland. National interest is not an exact legal concept. It is more a reflection of different configurations of 
constitutionally protected values. Accordingly, the Constitution of the Republic of Poland in its very first article 
states that the Republic of Poland shall be the common good of all citizens. This provision is accompanied by 
Art. 30 declaring the respect and protection for the inherent and inalienable dignity of the person. This 
'axiological spine' of Polish Constitutional system (Judgement of the Constitutional Court K 17/05) is 
supplemented by other values protected by the Constitution, including inter alia: ‘truth, justice, good and beauty’ 
(Preamble of the Constitution), ‘democracy’ (Art. 2 of the Constitution), ‘independence, integrity of territory, 
freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, security of the citizens, national heritage, natural environment’ (Art. 
5 of the Constitution), ‘freedom, cooperation and dialogue as criteria for the evaluation of any action by public 
authorities’ (Judgement of the Constitutional Court K 34/97), ‘national security, public order, protection of the 
environment, health, public morality, rights and liberties of others’ (Art. 31 of the Constitution, Judgement of the 
Constitutional Court P 2/98), ‘legal security and confidence in the law’ (Judgement of the Constitutional Court K 
21/99), ‘public interest’ (Judgement of the Constitutional Court K 24/97), ‘reliability and efficiency of the public 
authorities’ (Judgement of the Constitutional Court K 14/03), ‘efficient and uninterrupted operation of state 
bodies in the general public interest and freedom of public debate’(Judgement of the Constitutional Court K 
3/06), ‘budget balance’ (Judgement of the Constitutional Court K 15/01) and ‘caring for veterans’ (Judgement of 
the Constitutional Court K 12/02). 
 
The above-mentioned values serve as the basis for the adoption of relevant strategic objectives of Poland such as 
“to internationally promote principles of international law and universal values such as democracy, human rights 
and civil liberties, and to raise awareness of human and civil rights among the Polish society” (National Security 
Strategy 2014, p. 12). In case of the Republic of Poland, we can differentiate three categories of national interest 
(National Security Strategy 2007, p. 11-13): 
 
- vital interests like independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, safety 
of citizens, human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy; 
- significant interests such as sustainable economic development of the state, prosperity, scientific 
and technical development, protection of national heritage and the environment; 
- other essential interests meaning Poland's strong position in the international arena, the effective 
promotion of Polish interests, strengthening major international institutions including development 
of international relations based on respect for law and multilateral cooperation, consistent with the 
purposes and principles of the UN Charter. 
 
According to the above qualification Pillar I of R2P lies in the sphere of “vital interests”, while Pillars II and III 
are covered by “other essential interests”, which as hierarchically lower cannot be implemented at the expense of 
the former (Lewandowski, 2015, p. 190). This leads to the conflict of values, which cannot be solved without 
gentle evaluation of state priorities. 
 
Deciding whether Poland (or any given state) should actively participate in R2P implementation, especially in 
the context of the foreign military deployment, is a difficult multi-faceted process, which requires weighing of 
different interests. The main premise for taking such steps should be their potential effectiveness, proportionality 
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of costs, lack of excessive risk and the ability to achieve long-term results. The biggest problem lies in building a 
nexus between different set of interests in order to find reasons for sacrificing national self-interest for the 
common universal good. In this matter, responsibility to protect is supplemented by the ideas of international 
solidarity and good international citizenship. 
 
2. International solidarity and good international citizenship 
 
International solidarity as a strongly ethical concept has recently become the subject of interest by the UN. 
Already in 2001, the General Assembly adopted resolution on the promotion of a democratic and equitable 
international order in which it defined solidarity, as a fundamental value, by virtue of which global challenges 
must be managed in a way that distributes costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles of equity 
and social justice and ensures that those who suffer or who benefit the least receive help from those who benefit 
the most (2001 Resolution A/RES/56/151, par. 3(f)). This definition had been consequently repeated in the 
subsequent resolutions of the UN General Assembly on the promotion of a democratic and equitable 
international order (2002 Resolution A/RES/56/151, par. 4(f), 2004 Resolution A/RES/59/193, par. 4 (f)). 
However, the notion of international solidarity was introduced to international debate by M. Virally, who 
explained its dual role in the creation of international order: responding to threats (negative solidarity) and 
creating common rights and obligations (positive solidarity) (Virally, 1968, p. 542-543), based on commonly 
shared values. 
 
International solidarity as R2P is often treated as an emerging principle of international law (Wellens, 2005). Its 
normative character was definitely enforced through works of the Special Rapporteur on International Solidarity 
who in 2014 presented a proposed draft Declaration on the Right of Peoples and Individuals to International 
Solidarity (Annex of report A/HRC/26/34) according to which: 
 
“International solidarity shall be understood as the convergence of interests, purposes and actions 
between and among peoples, individuals, States and their international organizations in order to 
preserve the order and ensure the very survival of international society and to achieve common 
goals which require international cooperation and collective action, based on the international 
normative system of duties which they implement and practise to foster peace and security, 
development and human rights”. 
 
Currently international solidarity is starting to be treated as a human right. The switch in treatment can be 
observed in the official language of the General Assembly or Human Rights Council resolutions on promotion of 
a democratic and equitable international order. For already few years, both UN bodies define international 
solidarity as a right of peoples and individual (2014 HRC Resolution A/HRC/RES/25/15, 2015 GA Resolution 
A/RES/70/149), which shall be understood as a fundamental human right by which peoples and individuals have 
the freedom to enjoy, on the basis of equality and non-discrimination, the benefits of a harmonious international 
society with a just and fair international political and economic order, in which all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms may be fully realized. Despite these developments, there aren’t enough examples of state practice 
pointing at the normative character of international solidarity as a separate principle of international law. 
However, K. Wellens suggests that solidarity is still present in the existing international law in a form of 
substantive solidarity norms and procedural solidarity norms (Wellens, p. 2). 
 
The first group of norms consists of e.g. international humanitarian law, human rights law, international 
environmental law, refugee law or international development law. This group precisely and directly addresses 
both - negative and positive solidarity. The second group of solidarity norms concerns the diverse international 
obligations, which main objective is to achieve the state of international solidarity. The most glaring example of 
such norms are the provisions of the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
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Despite all these conceptual developments international solidarity (as well as responsibility to protect) remain 
dependent on actual national interest, which shape states’ attitude towards their implementation. J.M. Coicaud 
categorized four structural factors limiting proper implementation of the two above-mentioned concepts 
(Coicaud, Book 2). The first factor is the national disposition of international life. The second factor covers the 
limits of modern democratic solidarity. According to J.M. Coicaud solidarity based on democratic values, which 
shape contemporary international community, is not enough to solve dilemma that what is internationally owed 
to others is weighed against the demands of the national community and its members. This leads to the third 
factor – preference given to what is nationally owed over what is internationally owed. Meaning that states 
always focus on ensuring that the costs of foreign assistance are not paid at the expense of nationals. This 
challenge may be described in terms of "solidarity with" and "solidarity within" characterizing relations between 
any international organizations (or international community) and its members. Solidarity with populations in 
need often loses to solidarity within a Member State or even a regional organization. National interest prevails 
over solidarity and human rights among nations and beyond borders. 
 
Finally, protecting human rights of foreigners is still considered as a moral rather than legal obligation. 
International solidarity and responsibility to protect lacking strict legal status are not so persuasive for states in 
this manner. Lack of a normative character makes it also difficult to point the exact bearer of responsibilities. 
While one can easily identify the bearer of responsibilities under Pillar I, it is almost impossible to precisely 
indicate who should act under responsibilities covered by Pillars II and III. Problem lies in only overall 
determination of one of the addressees of these responsibilities, namely international community which “is at 
best an aspirational cliché, at worst a misleading description of something that has yet to be adequately defined, 
let alone realised” (Beeson, 2015). The issue is thus which states and whether they are obliged to participate in 
fulfilling the responsibilities of the international community, to what extent and under what motives? G. Evans, 
one of the founding fathers of R2P, proposed the idea of so-called „good international citizenship” (Evans 1988, 
1989, 1995) as a possible answer to that question. 
 
Good international citizenship was firstly mentioned by R. Michener - the Canadian Governor General who in 
1967, during his speech, summarized that Canada was a good international citizen worthy of trust and capable of 
leadership. He also underlined that with such powers responsibility and opportunity to combat hunger, disease, 
poverty, and ignorance, which threaten the peace as much as territorial and racial dispute, come (Michener, 
1967, p. 193-202). Contemporary idea of good international citizenship, however, was entirely shaped by G. 
Evans who insisted on placing it next to the security and economic interests as an element of national interest 
(Evans, 2008, p. 229-230). G. Evans acknowledges that good international citizenship presents more useful 
framework to deal with the complexity of the interdependent world in the 21st century than traditional focus on 
narrowly defined security and economic interest (Evans, 2015). Good international citizenship is an area of 
international policy, in which the most important values of the national community have a major impact on the 
realization of national interests on the international forum. According to G. Evans, good international 
citizenship, while retaining the character of objective national interest, cannot be fully understood without 
reference to the identity of the community and its guiding principles (Evans, 1989). Credibility serves as a major 
feature of a good international citizen, which should ensure a consistent and impartial compliance with the 
relevant standards by himself before “blaming and shaming” other members of international community (Evans, 
1989). In other words, a good international citizen should have a good record of human rights protection. 
 
Despite these suggestions, there is no definition of good international citizenship itself. A. Pert advises that 
instead of strenuous attempts to define it, one should analyse why states can be labelled as good international 
citizens (Pert, 2012, p. 3). This analysis is based on breaking the term into components that are clear and can be 
defined. Understanding of good international citizenship from the perspective of international law, according to 
A. Pert thus refers to two basic criteria (Pert, 2012, p. 3): 
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- the state's involvement in the application of international law understood as the ratification of 
treaties, compliance with treaties, policies and practices of the state in areas such as human rights, 
environmental protection, anti-terrorism, treatment of asylum seekers; 
- the involvement of the state in multilateralism on issues such as climate change, relations within 
the UN, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping and disarmament. 
 
In addition to these leading categories, A. Pert mentions such qualities of a good international citizen as 
readiness to fulfil the tasks of the international community, fulfilling “good international deeds” and being a 
leader involved in the continuous raising of international standards (Pert, 2012, p. 4). At the same time A. Pert 
emphasizes that the state cannot be precisely defined as a good or a bad international citizen. Such assessment 
requires evaluating different actions undertaken by the State (Pert, 2012, p. 7). This process can occur on the 
basis of all, and every one with the above-mentioned categories. 
 
The idea of good international citizenship clearly fits in the frames of responsibility to protect. At the end, good 
international citizen is the state, which protects its population from massive human rights violations at a level 
that validates it as an entity that could properly participate in fulfilling international community’s obligations 
under Pillars II and III. Should responsibility to protect be exclusively the domain of good international citizens, 
who can condemn those “bad citizens” as unworthy of the name? Definitely not! Individualism of good 
international citizenship is based on the national values, which define international politics through which states 
individually shape the characteristics of their good citizenship. In other words, there is no single standard of 
good international citizenship, thus each state before acting should evaluate its reliability as a member of 
international community. The best environment for such evaluation is multilateral engagement by which states 
can easily discuss and debate on their performance under human rights standards, establish the relevance of their 
national values for international politics, as well as promote certain solutions.  
 
3. Responsibility to protect and multilateralism 
 
Multilateralism equips states with a possibility to reconcile their national interests with these of the international 
community. Multilateralism is of particular importance in case of R2P implementation through foreign military 
deployment. The UN through its multilateralism tries to make its position on R2P both legitimate and legal. Such 
strategy is contrary to the strategies presented by some major powers like Russian Federation or the United 
States, which focus mainly on unilateralism, often taking actions outside of the accepted R2P framework. 
Unilateralism in R2P implementation often leads to questioning the legality and legitimacy of actions taken by 
individual powers “implementing” responsibility to protect. In opposition to unilateralism, multilateral approach 
presented by the UN combines a series of policy aims, such as the promotion of democracy, human rights, and 
good governance and the safeguarding of peace and security. 
 
Multilateralism is an institutional form which coordinates above-mentioned values among three or more states 
on the basis of generalized principles of conduct, defining ‘generalized principles’ as those which specify 
appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the 
strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence (Ruggie, 1992, p. 571). S. Blavoukos and D. 
Bourantonis distinguish two kinds of multilateralism: instrumental multilateralism and principled multilateralism 
(Blavoukos, Bourantonis, 2011, p. 6). The first serves as one of many institutional forms which can be employed 
to achieve certain national policy goals without having intrinsic value per se, while the latter remains a “part of 
an ongoing, taken-for-granted subjective understanding of international life”, comprising “deliberative and 
communicative aspects, an emphasis in cooperation through mutual understanding, and norms-oriented 
behaviour”. Taking into account the UN’s unconditional support to multilateralism in R2P implementation 
throughout resolutions of its main organs, policy documents and other official statements suggest that the UN 
ranks among the principled “multilateralists”. 
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The UN serves as the collection point of ideas and policies derived from the collective weight of international 
values defined by its objectives and purposes but also by national interests of its Member States. The main 
challenge is to reconcile goals and values represented by the Member States and the Organization as a whole. 
The process of such reconciliation is best reflected by the coherent relationship between the policies the UN and 
its Member States. Coherence in policy-making should be understood as: “policy-making that seeks to achieve 
common, identifiable goals that are devised and implemented in an environment of collaboration, coordination 
and cooperative planning among and within (Lewis, Benedek, Müller Funk, 2014) the UN, among the UN 
bodies and its member states, as well as among Member States”. Despite the fact that various UN bodies have 
mechanisms to enable effective implementation of the objectives of the responsibility to protect, the practice of 
using these mechanisms shows that often an organization as a whole is not able to present a unified and 
coordinated program for the prevention of mass atrocities. The UN is aware of this deficiency in functioning and 
tries to prevent it. Examples of such efforts to eliminate inconsistencies include the Rights Up Front Initiative 
and proposed Code of Conduct on the functioning of the members of the Security Council in relation to the mass 
atrocities.  
 
The Rights Up Front Initiative was formed as a response to criticism of the UN's activities in connection with the 
civil war in Sri Lanka, which were characterized by non-uniformity and lack of system solutions. This criticism 
has been summarised by C. Petrie (Internal Review Panel Report) who recommended "a comprehensive review 
of the system of the United Nations during the conflict in Sri Lanka and the humanitarian activities taken by the 
United Nations after the conflict”. Those recommendations took the consolidated form of the Rights Up Front 
Initiative presented in December 2013, which provided guidance for the UN to develop a uniform practice 
concerning the situation of serious human rights violations in the future (Rights Up Front, 2014). The creators of 
the Initiative stressed that the UN is not always able to fulfil its task of promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights. This situation was caused by the lack of a coherent system of response strategies at risk of serious 
human rights violations, as well as the inability to achieve agreement by the Member States on concerted action, 
which deprives the international community of effective measures to prevent and combat mass crimes. Initiative 
is primarily set out in the six-point action plan for the Secretariat of the UN, its funds and agencies: 
 
i. First, the UN Secretary-General points the need for better integration of human rights in the 
activities of the United Nations, so that all employees understand their own responsibilities, and 
obligations of the United Nations in the field of human rights protection. 
ii. Second, Member States should be provided with information regarding endangered populations 
or victims of serious violations of human rights or humanitarian law of armed conflicts. 
iii. Third, there is a need to ensure a coherent strategy for the UN field actions to fully use the 
United Nations system to respond in a coordinated way. 
iv. Fourth, there is a need to clarify and streamline procedures at the UN headquarters to improve 
communication within its units working in the field and to facilitate taking of early, coordinated 
action. 
v. Fifth, the UN should strengthen its capacity in the field of human rights, in particular through 
better coordination of its bodies dealing with the protection and promotion of human rights. 
vi. Sixth, the United Nations should develop common system for managing information on serious 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law. 
  
The Rights Up Front Initiative contributes to the R2P concept at the international and institutional level 
(Informal remarks on Rights Up Front; Mailer, 2014) but it is difficult, at this stage, to assess the impact of the 
Initiative on the development of the responsibility to protect. Despite the explicit reference to the Rights Up 
Front in the Report of 2014 the Secretary-General does not propose any mechanism for its implementation as 
part of the R2P toolkit (the SG’s report of 2014). The Secretary-General only emphasizes the role of the 
Initiative as a way to improve the ability of the UN to fulfil obligations under Pillar II and to coordinate actions 
taken by the Human Rights Council, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and other 
competent authorities. 
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Regarding the activities of the Security Council, in response to the controversy over the use of the veto by the 
permanent members of the Council, primarily due to the ongoing conflict in Syria, ACT Group (Accountability, 
Coherence and Transparency) in October 2015 presented a proposal for a Code of Conduct (Draft Code of 
Conduct) concerning the acts of the members of the Security Council in relation to the mass crimes. Code of 
Conduct was presented as a way to provide for greater political accountability at the UN. The proposed Code of 
Conduct provides that: 
 
i. states pledge to support a quick and decisive action of the Security Council aimed at preventing 
or ending genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes; 
ii. states pledge to abstain from voting against the draft resolution of the Council in this respect; 
iii. states declare the full and urgent attention to the recommendations of the Secretary General 
presented to the Security Council on the situation, which include or may lead to mass murder. 
 
Code of Conduct is not considered to bind only the permanent members of the Security Council. Its designed for 
all UN Member States, which are or which will be a future members of the Council. Code of Conduct was 
initially signed by 104 Member States, including the United Kingdom and France as permanent members. As all 
tools for R2P implementation, the Code of Conduct requires real implementation and not just commitments. 
Sooner or later, states’ commitments will be challenged by the situation requiring balancing timely and decisive 
reaction of the international community with national interests of the members of the UN Security Council 
 
Conclusions 
 
National interest, understood as an expression of government's commitments towards its own population, is an 
indispensable element of the decision-making process. States are not fully resistant to arguments for the 
protection of international values, but decisions on the use of force or other forms of participation in the 
realization of international community’s responsibilities under Pillars II and III will always be based largely on 
the question of actually existing national interest. The fact that states are considering the interest in deciding 
whether to react or not, however, is not their moral indifference. The primary responsibility of any government is 
to care for its own citizens, whose interests may be affected by the activity of the state under Pillar II and III. 
Responsibility to protect does not alter this situation. Although you can construct a variety of hypothetical 
institutional framework to ensure efficient, impartial and consistent response to humanitarian crises, all such 
proposals are in fact verified by pre-defined interests of the states. 
 
The role of the UN is therefore to reconcile these different interests and put an effort to combine them into added 
value for R2P implementation. It is not an easy task. Main challenges for the active and credible R2P 
implementation by and within the UN are: 1) turning its ambitious commitment into real practice; 2) making a 
whole and unified policy from disparate parts presented by different Member States, 3) reconciling often 
discrepant interests of the organization and its Member States. These challenges should be addressed with 
coherent actions oriented at helping other states to implement and abide by these rules and engaging actively in 
multilateral forums, by promoting a forward-looking agenda that is not limited to a narrow defence of national 
interests. As explained in the idea of good international citizenship, national interests should be motivated and 
publicly justified in the name of humanity and the rule of law. The UN shall act as a leader that groups partners 
with different interests but simultaneously with comparable achievements in the field of human rights. This 
would result in a better understanding of R2P and therefore its faster development. 
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